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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 920579-CA
vs.
Priority No. 10
DEVON BOYD POTTER,
Defendant-Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The Appellant's statement of the Jurisdiction and Nature of
the Proceedings is sufficient.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly suppress evidence seized

pursuant to a warrant when the warrant was obtained after police
entered Defendant's home and the trial court found no exigent
circumstances to enter the home. A trial court's "exigent
circumstances" determination is reversed on appeal only if it is
clearly erroneous.
2.

State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (1987).

Should this court consider Appellant's argument that

suppression was not proper because the evidence was allegedly
seized independently from the illegal entry when this issue was
not argued at the trial court.

If this new issue is considered,

it is reviewed as a question of law without deference to the

trial court.

Seoura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 799, 104

S.Ct. 3380, 3382 (1984) .
3.

Was there sufficient probable cause to issue the

warrant.

The Utah Court's have adopted the "totality of the

circumstances" test in determining probable cause.

Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983); State v. Anderson,
701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1989).
finding.
4.

Deference is given to the magistrates

State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1109 (Utah App. 1988) .
Did the affiant make statements in the Affidavit with

reckless disregard for the truth, and should these statements be
set aside and probable cause determined on the other facts in the
Affidavit.

Franks v. Delaware, 430 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674

(1978) .
5.

Did the trial court correctly rule that the search

warrant was invalid because it failed to describe the place to be
searched with sufficient particularity when the address was
incorrect, the location of Defendant's trailer house was
incorrect, there was no city mentioned in the description, and
there was only a minimal description of the home itself.

This

issue is subject to non-deferential review for legal error to
ascertain whether by looking at the warrant, could the officer,
with reasonable effort locate the correct premises to be
searched.

United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090 (11th Cir.

1986) .
2

6.

Is the Leon "good faith" exception applicable when the

officers did not act in an objectively reasonable manner by
entering the home without exigent circumstances, by using
information gathered after the warrantless entry in the
affidavit, by making statements to the magistrate with reckless
disregard for the truth, and by presenting to the magistrate a
facially deficient warrant.

Once the underlying facts are

established, this is a question of law.

United States v.

Russell, 960 F.2d 421 (5th Cir.), cert, denied..

U.S.

,

113 S.Ct. 407 (1992).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES AND RULES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution reads
essentially the same.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 15, 1991, an officer stopped a suspect for
suspicion of DUI. After the stop, the obviously intoxicated
suspect talked to the officer about leniency if he told the
officer about a dope party going on.
3

The suspect said that a

dope party was going on at the DeVon Potter residence, which was
nearby, and that there were seven individuals at the residence,
and they had a big bag of marijuana, and that they were smoking
the marijuana.
Based on this information, and without a search warrant, the
officers forcefully entered the Potter residence and secured the
premises until a search warrant could be obtained.

Upon entering

the premises the officers noted there were only three individuals
in the residence, there was no visual signs of illegal
substances, the individuals did not appear to be under the
influence of any illegal substances, and there was no odor of
marijuana.

Before the search warrant was obtained, DeVon Potter

asked the offices to leave but they refused to do so.
While the officers were securing the residence, a pit bull
terrier belonging to Brett Potter, one of the individuals in the
residence, became agitated, and Brett asked if he could take the
dog to his residence which was nearby.

An officer accompanied

Brett to his residence, and along the way Brett was attempting to
restrain his dog, but the officer interpreted his actions as if
he was attempting to dispose of something.

A subsequent search

of the area found no illegal substances.
About two to three hours later, a search warrant was
obtained by Officer Tom Harrison.

The incident involving the

suspicious activity of Brett Potter was included in the Affidavit
4

in support of the warrant.

After the search warrant was served,

DeVon Potter gave to the Officers a small amount of marijuana
that was located at his residence.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence for the reason that
it was obtained as the result of an illegal search and seizure in
violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, and Article I Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution,
reasons.

this motion was based on at last four main

First, there were no exigent circumstances warranting

the initial entry into the home, and once the officers entered
the home they should have immediately left because it was quite
apparent that the statements made by the DUI suspect were
incorrect.

Second, there was insufficient probable cause to

support the issuance of the warrant because the statements by the
DUI suspect were suspect because of his intoxication, his selfinterest in making the statements, and that the statements were
apparently incorrect as the officers observed after entering the
residence.

Third, the affiant, Tom Harrison, made statements in

his Affidavit with reckless disregard for the truth.
particular, the statements made by the DUI suspect.

In
These should

have been omitted because they were incorrect as the officers
discovered as they entered the premises.

And fourth, the search

warrant was defective in that it did not "particularly" describe
the place to be searched.

The State responded to Defendant's
5

arguments, and also argued that the evidence should nevertheless
be admitted under the Leon "good faith" exception.
The trial court granted Defendant's motion on the basis that
there were no exigent circumstances to enter Defendant's home,
and the warrant did not particularly describe the place to be
searched.

The Court did not specifically rule on Defendant's

other two arguments or the State's good faith argument.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
(reference made the transcript of the preliminary hearing
shall be denoted as "T", and references to the Record shall be
denoted as "R")
1.
Utah.

DeVon Potter resides at 75 West 400 North, Huntington,

He lives in a trailer home which is the third one heading

West on 400 North.
2.

(See T. 65 lines 5-8; and p. 52 lines 11-15.)

On February 15, 1991, Emery County Deputy Sheriff Gayle

Jensen stopped an individual for suspicion of DUI.

The stop was

made a short distance from DeVon Potter's residence.

(See T. 23

lines 2 and 3; and p. 8 line 24 through p. 9 line 2.)
3.

The DUI suspect was obviously intoxicated.

Upon making

contact with the officer, the DUI suspect began asking if he
would get a break if he told the officer about a dope party
nearby.

(See T. 8 lines 10-14; and p. 10 lines 6 - 20.)

6

4.

The DUI suspect told officer Jensen that a dope party

was going on at Devon Potter's residence, and that they had a big
bag of marijuana, and that there were seven individuals rolling
and smoking marijuana joints.
line 2)

There was no big pot party going on at Devon Potter's

residence.
5.

(See T. 8 line 24 through p. 9

(See T. 68 lines 19-25.)

As the officer was processing the DUI suspect, he

noticed individuals peering out of a window at DeVon Potter's
residence.
6.

(See T. 13 lines 11 - 13.)

Officer Jensen radioed for assistance, and one of the

officers to respond was Tom Harrison of the Emery County Drug
Task Force.
7.

(See T. 41 lines 5-7 and lines 15-25.)

The officers observed one car pull up to Devon Potter's

residence, and then leave a short time later.

(See T. 25 lines

5-8 and lines 18-21.)
8.

Without a warrant, and without knocking, and without

seeking independent corroboration of the DUI suspects'
statements, and without checking the veracity of the DUI suspect,
the officers forcefully entered Devon Potter's residence, and
secured the premises until a warrant could be obtained.
the officers to enter the residence was Tom Harrison.

One of
(See T. 13

lines 5-7; and lines 19 and 20; and p. 69 lines 9-18.)
9.

Upon entering the residence the officers observed that

there were only three individuals at the residence, there was no
7

odor of marijuana, there were no visual signs of illegal
substances, and the individuals did not appear to be under the
influence of any illegal substances.
in detecting the odor of marijuana.

The officers were trained
(See T. 26 line 2 through p.

27 line 17.)
10.

When the officers entered the residence, a pit bull

terrier belonging to Brett Potter, one of the individuals in the
residence, became agitated, and Brett asked if he could take the
dog to his residence which was nearby.

One of the officers

granted permission to do so, and accompanied Brett to his
trailer.

Along the way Brett was attempting to restrain the dog,

and the officer interpreted Brett's actions as trying to dispose
of something along the path to Brett's residence.

However,

a

search of the area by the officer revealed no illegal substances.
(See T. 32 lines 6-14; and R. 15). This allegedly suspicious
conduct was included in the Affidavit of Tom Harrison in an
effort to obtain the warrant.
11.

While the officers were at DeVon Potter's residence,

and before any search warrant arrived, DeVon Potter asked them to
leave, but they refused to do so.
12.

(See T. 74 lines 11-17.)

Officer Tom Harrison went to meet with the county

attorney to prepare a search warrant.

After this meeting, and

before going to get a magistrates signatures, Officer Harrison
intended to return to Devon Potter's residence.
8

However,

he

went to the wrong trailer home.

(See T. 52 line 16 through p. 53

line 25.)
13.

The Affidavit signed by Officer Harrison listed as

information in support of the warrant the statements made by the
DUI suspect.

These are the facts that officer Harrison relied

upon in obtaining the search warrant along with the incident with
Brett Potter after the initial entry.

(See T. 46 lines 6-16; and

R. 12-15).
14.

Under the reliability section of the Affidavit, Officer

Harrison indicated that the informant volunteered the information
which was against his own penal interest.

Under the verification

section of the Affidavit, Officer Harrison indicated that Jim
Ward, one of the occupants of the trailer, was a convicted drug
user, that he had been told by others in the drug trade that
DeVon Potter was involved in drugs, that the occupants in the
trailer were very nervous because they were peering out the
window at the traffic stop, and he described the incident with
Brett Potter.
15.

(See R. 13, 14).

Officer Harrison did not tell the magistrate that most

of the DUI suspect's statements proved to be incorrect as the
officers observed after entering the premises.

Also, Officer

Harrison did not inform the magistrate that the DUI suspect was
obviously intoxicated, that he only volunteered the information

9

after asking the officer about leniency, and that nothing was
found as a result of the Brett Potter incident.
16.

(See R. 12-15) .

Magistrate Stan Truman signed the search warrant.

The

search warrant described the premises to be searched as "50 West
400 North, Black's Trailer Court, single wide trailer, second
trailer headed West on 400 North on South side of road, belonging
to DeVon Potter."

There was no indication of the city where the

trailer was located.
17.

(See R. 10) .

About two to three hours after initial entry, the

search warrant was served on DeVon Potter, and he was told by
the police that if he had any controlled substances he had better
turn it over to them or they wold tear the place apart searching
for it.

At this time, Devon Potter gave to the police a small

amount of marijuana he had at the residence.

A complete search

was then conducted by the officers, and some drug paraphernalia
was found. (See T. 57 lines 4-15.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The initial warrantless entry constituted and violation of
Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and his rights under the
Utah Constitution, because there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the entry.

The trial court was correct in finding no

exigent circumstances because there was no evidence presented
which would indicate that the evidence might or would be
imminently destroyed if the officers did not enter immediately
10

without a warrant.

The "independent source" source doctrine is

not applicable because the seizure was not so attenuated from the
search so as to dissipate the illegal taint, the independent
source cases cited by the State are distinguishable, and the
Defendant challenged the warrant herein.
There was insufficient probable cause to issue the warrant,
especially when you consider the warrant was issued based upon
the uncorroborated

and unverified statements of a drunk driver

who was trying to get a deal on his case.
In addition, the affiant made statements in his Affidavit
with reckless disregard for the truth in that he should have not
included most if not all of the statements from the drunk driver
because it was apparent upon entering the premises that much of
what the drunk driver said was incorrect.

The affiant did not

relay these facts to the issuing magistrate.

These statements

should be omitted from the Affidavit, and probable cause
determined on the remaining statements.
Furthermore, the search warrant itself is facially invalid
because it failed to describe the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity.

The address was incorrect, the

physical location of the home was described incorrectly, the city
was not listed, and there was only a minimal physical description
of the home.

Also, when the affiant went to the scene he went to

11

the wrong residence indicating that there needed to be a
particular description of the premises in this case.
Finally, the Leon "good faith'1 exception is not applicable
in this case because the officer did not act in an objectively
reasonable manner by, among other things, not verifying the
statements of the drunk driver, entering the premises without a
warrant when exigent circumstances did not exist, by not
immediately leaving Defendant's residence when it was apparent
that much of what the drunk driver said was incorrect, by seeking
a search warrant and including in his affidavit evidence that was
obtained after the illegal entry, by not informing the magistrate
of the discoveries upon entering the premises.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INITIAL WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO THE DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE
VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BECAUSE THERE WERE
NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING SUCH AN ENTRY.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, prohibit
"Unreasonable searches and seizures."

Warrantless searches and

seizures "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions."

See, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.

347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514 (1967) as cited in State v. Ashe, 745
12

P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987).

Where a home is involved, the

burden is particularly heavy on the state to show that one of the
specific exceptions is applicable.

In Payton v. New York, 445

U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1379, 1380 (1980), the United
States Supreme Court stated that warrantless "entry into the home
is the chief evil against which the Fourth Amendment is
directed."
One of the specific exceptions to the warrant rule is if
there are "exigent Circumstances" justifying a warrantless entry.
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022,
2032 (1971).

The state has the burden of showing that exigent

circumstances warranted a warrantless entry.

See United States

v. Cvaron, 700 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1983) . The state attempts to
use State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987), as a case "quite
similar" to the present case in an attempt to show exigent
circumstances.

In Ashe, the Utah Supreme Court did hold there

were exigent circumstances, but the facts of Ashe are quite
distinguishable from this case.
In Ashe, a confidential informant was given instructions by
the suspect to leave the suspect's residence, go to another
residence, make a sell of contraband,
proceeds in a few minutes.
police.

and return with the

The informant then reported to the

The police concluded that if they tried to obtain a

search warrant at that time, it would take too long, and the
13

suspect would get suspicious as to why the informant had not
returned within a few minutes, and the suspect would then figure
something was up and would destroy the remaining contraband.
Thus, without a warrant, the police entered the suspects dwelling
and seized the contraband.
In the present case, there was no indication to the police
that if they did not act immediately, the evidence, if any, would
be destroyed.

Prior to their entry into Defendant's residence,

all the police knew is that a drunk driver, in an effort to get a
good deal on his case, made some uncorroborated statements that a
pot party was going on at the Defendant's residence.

In

addition, the police indicated that the occupants of Defendant's
residence looked out the window, and during a period of about 45
minutes to an hour, one car came and left.

The fact that the

drunk driver was intoxicated and that he made the statements in
an obvious effort to get a good deal on his case, should have
made his statements suspect to the police, and they should have
conducted further investigation to try to corroborate the
statements, or they could have secured the premises outside while
waiting for a warrant.

See United States v. Ortega-Serrano, 788

F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1986).

Also, the fact that the occupants of

Defendant's dwelling were looking out the window should not
necessarily arouse the suspicion of the officers since it is only
natural for someone to look out their window to see what is going
14

on when you have flashing police lights outside your house.

The

state asserts that in this case the Defendant, as in Ashe, had
been alerted to a narcotics investigation.

Presumably, this

assertion is based on the mere fact that Defendant and others had
looked out the window and saw the police talking to Sandstorm.
This assumption would carry a lot more validity if Sandstorm was
sent on a drug run as in Ashe.

But such was not the case, and

this is exactly the point the trial court made -- that there was
no evidence presented to indicate that the Defendant would have
any idea that Sandstorm would tell the police about the alleged
pot party.
In addition, the fact of a car coming and leaving should not
necessarily have aroused the officers suspicion as that can
easily be explained by the coincidental visit of a friend or
family member which in this case it was.

It is also important to

note that the mere fact that the offense involves narcotics is
insufficient in and of itself to justify a warrantless entry.
See United States v. Thomas, 893 F.2d 482 (2nd Cir. 1990) .
Consequently, there were no exigent circumstances.

The

police made an illegal entry into defendant's residence, and then
illegally detained Defendant while they waited for a warrant.
What is especially offensive about this police conduct is that
after they entered the premises it should have been apparent to
them that the statements made by the drunk driver were not
15

truthful.

The drunk driver stated there was a big dope party

going on with lots of people (at least seven), smoking marijuana.
However, when the police entered there were only three
individuals in the home, there were no visual signs of controlled
substances or drug paraphernalia, the Defendant and the other
occupants did not appear to be under the influence of illegal
substances, and most importantly, there was no odor of marijuana.
Both of the officers admitted at the suppression hearing that
they were trained to detect the odor of marijuana, and that they
knew the odor of marijuana, but they did not detect any such odor
after entering Defendant's home.

If there was some big pot

party going on, certainly, the odor of the marijuana would have
lingered in the residence.

In spite of the apparent

inconsistencies in the drunk driver's story, the police detained
the Defendant even after being asked to leave by the Defendant.
The state further argues that the marijuana "might quite
literally go up in smoke" as further justification for the
warrantless entry.
facts.

This conclusion is not supported by the

Supposedly, Sandstrom told the police there was a bag of

marijuana "three fingers deep."

If this were true, it would have

taken a long time to consume all of the marijuana giving the
police sufficient time to obtain a warrant.
A.

The Trial Court did not overstate the Degree of Proof of
"Exigent Circumstances."
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The State attempts to make an issue of the fact that the
trial judge used the word "would" in determining exigent
circumstances and thus used to stringent of a standard.

The

state asserts, quoting Ashe, that the proper legal standard is if
the suspects "might" destroy the evidence.
matter of semantics.

This merely is a

Several courts have used several different

words is setting forth the exigent circumstances standard, and
they all essentially mean the same thing.

In fact, in some of

the very cases that the Utah Supreme Court cited in Ashe (in
footnote 10) in support of its exigent circumstances standard,
different terms are used instead of "might."

For example, in

United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1982).

The

court stated the police could enter if from the totality of the
circumstances they believed the contraband "will immediately be
destroyed." (Emphasis added.)

In addition, the term "eminent

destruction" was used in United States v. Gardner, 553 F.2d 946,
948 (5th Cir. 1977), and in United States v. Shima, 545 P.2d 1026
(5th Cir. 1977), all of which were cited in Ashe.

Even in United

States v. Manfredi, 722 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1983), where the court
used the work "might," the court actually held exigent
circumstances was present if the officers believed there was
"...a substantial risk the remaining cocaine might be
destroyed..." 722 F.2d at 522, 523 (emphasis added).
In the present case, in viewing the totality of the
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circumstances, there was no "substantial risk" that the alleged
contraband "might" or "would" be "imminently destroyed."

As

mentioned, the main distinguishing fact between Ashe and this
case which supports this conclusion is the fact that in Ashe a
runner had been sent on a drug run, and the police were concerned
about the runner not returning within the anticipated time.
fact, at least three of the cases cited in Ashe,

In

and cited

above, Manfredi, Cvaron, and Kunkler, all dealt with a suspect
possibly being tipped off due to a drug runner not returning
within the anticipated time.
B. The Argument that the Officers Entered the Premises just
to Secure them does not Justify the Initial Entry,
The state also cites State v. Rocha, 600 p.2d 543 (Utah
1979), Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S. Ct. 2408; and State
v. Pursifall. 751 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1988), as examples of
exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry to secure
the premises until a warrant could be obtained.
cases can be factually distinguished.
entered pursuant to an arrest.

All of these

In Rocha, the police

There was no arrest here either

before or immediately after entry.

And Mincey and Pursifall,

dealt with a homicide or shooting on or near the residence, and
the police were justified in entering the premises to apprehend a
gunman or to discover other victims.

The present care comes no

where close to those types of exigent circumstances.

The Utah

Supreme Court in Pursifall held that the police could enter if
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they "have a reasonable belief that a person within needs
immediate assistance; or (2) promptly search the scene
of a homicide for other victims or a killer on the premises.
Pursifall, 751 P.2d at 827.
The state's next issue that the evidence was seized by
authority that was independent from the pre-warrant entry, is
raised for the first time on appeal, and should not be considered
by this court.

If this issue is considered, this court should

still uphold the trial court's order of suppression.
C.

The Independent Source Doctrine is not Applicable.

The Defendant submits that even though the evidence in
question was obtained after the warrant was served, the evidence
was still "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" due to the prior illegal
entry.

In response to this the state has argued the "Independent

Source" doctrine as articulated in Segura v. United States, 468
U.S. 796, 104 S. Ct. 3380 (1984), and subsequently adopted by the
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah 1986),
and State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah App. 1988).

In

response to the Independent source argument, Defendant sets forth
the following arguments:
1. The seizure of the evidence was not so attenuated
from the illegal entry so as to dissipate the taint.
First, the seizure of the evidence was not "so attenuated as
to dissipate the taint".
3385.

Segura, 468 U.S. at 805, 104 S. Ct. at

In determining if there has been sufficient attenuation,
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the United States Supreme Court, in a decision subsequent to
Segura, held "The ultimate question therefore, is whether the
search pursuant to warrant was in fact a genuinely independent
source of the information and tangible evidence at issue here.
This would not have been the case if the agents decision to seek
the warrant was prompted by what they had seen during the initial
entry, or if information obtained during that entry was presented
to the magistrate and effected his decision to issue the
warrant."

Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542, 108 S. Ct.

2529, 2536 (1988).

In the present case, the affiant submitted an

attachment with his affidavit, and by reference, made the
attachment part of the affidavit.

The attachment set forth an

incident that happened after the illegal entry.

In particular,

the attachment described allegedly suspicious activities of the
Defendant's brother while walking back to his trailer.

Without

question, the affiant submitted this information in an effort to
persuade the magistrate, and presumably the magistrate considered
the information in making his decision.

Therefore, there was

insufficient attenuation between the illegal entry and the
subsequent warrant, and thus, no completely independent source.
We simply cannot let the police gain illegal entry to a home, and
then use information gathered after the illegal entry to support
an affidavit for a search warrant.
2. There was no long period of time between the
violation of Defendant's constitutional rights and service of the
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warrant, and thus, no attenuation.
Second, there is insufficient attenuation also on the basis
that the illegal physical entry constituted an invasion of
Defendant's right of privacy which was exacerbated by the
continued occupation of the premises.

And that illegal invasion

of Defendant's privacy continued right up until service of the
warrant.

Consequently, there was no long period of time between

the prior illegality and the warrant search.

"The Fourth

Amendment to the Constitution protects people, not places,"
Secrura. 468 U.S. at 799, 800, 104 S. Ct. at 3382, and Defendant's
personal right of privacy is what needs protecting here.

As a

result of the illegal entry and detention, the police improperly
inhibited the Defendant's right of privacy and his right to come
and go as he pleases.
3. The State's "Independent Source11 cases are
distinguishable.
Third, the facts in Segura and Northrup are significantly
distinguishable.

In Segura, the Defendant was arrested

immediately outside his apartment.

The police then entered the

apartment, and in the course of a security check, saw contraband
in plain view.

468 U.S. at 799-801, 104 S. Ct. at 3382. 3383.

In Northrup, the police actually observed drug buys at
Defendant's residence.

The police entered Defendant's residence

and arrested all occupants, and observed contraband in plain
view.

In the present case, there were no arrests of Defendant or
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any other occupant, and there was no contraband in plain view.
The Defendant was simply held against his will for close to three
hours in spite of the fact that there were no observable signs of
illegal activity.

In fact, this case is especially offensive

because, as mentioned, when the police entered Defendant's
residence it was obviously apparent that many of the drunk
driver's statements were unfounded, especially since there was
no lingering odor of marijuana.

If there was some big pot party

going on, there certainly would have been a lingering odor.
However, in spite of this discovery, the police went ahead and
illegally detained Defendant and his companions for close to
three house and obtained a search warrant based on the suspect
information.
4. The Independent Source Doctrine is not applicable
if the warrant is challenged.
And fourth, and maybe most significantly, a main factor in
both Segura and Northrup was that the Defendant did not challenge
the warrant itself.

In fact, in noting no challenge to the

warrant, the Utah Supreme Court held in Northrup that, "Therefore
we uphold the trial court's ruling that evidence seized pursuant
to the warrant was admissible." 756 P.2d at 1288.

In the present

case, the Defendant has definitely challenged the warrant on the
grounds of insufficient probable cause, the officers making
reckless statements in support of the warrant, insufficiency of
the description of the premises to be searched, and inclusion in
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the affidavit of information obtained after the illegal entry.
It is apparent that if there are challenges to the warrant, all
of these challenges must be decided in favor of the state before
this court can conclude that the independent source doctrine is
applicable and the evidence in question is not fruit of the
poisonous tree.

For the foregoing reasons, and the subsequent

arguments herein, this court should conclude that there is
insufficient attenuation between the illegal entry and the
warrant, and that the evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree.
POINT II
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE SEARCH
WARRANT.
The Utah Courts have adopted the "totality of the
circumstances'1 test in determining the sufficiency of probable
cause to support a warrant.
285 (Utah App. 1990).

See State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284,

This test was first adopted by the United

States Supreme Court in the case of Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 230, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328 (1983).

"Accordingly, the

magistrate must consider all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit and make a 'practical, common-sense decision
whether...there is a fair probability' that criminal evidence
will be found in the described place."

Brown, 798 P.2d at 286

citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332.
The Court in Brown went on to state that "the United States
Supreme Court has stated that the veracity, reliability and basis
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of knowledge of an informant 'should be understood simply as
closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the
common sense, practical question of whether there is probable
cause to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a
particular place.7"

Brown 798 P.2d at 286 citing Gates, 462 U.S.

at 230, 103 S.Ct. at 2328.

In other words, the reliability and

veracity of an informants statements are still important factors
when considering the totality of the circumstances.
In this particular case we are dealing with a citizen
informant, and "courts view the testimony of citizen informers
with less rigid scrutiny than the testimony of police
informers...because citizen informers, unlike police informers,
volunteer information out of concern for the community and not
for personal benefit."

Brown, 798 P.2d at 286.

The key

distinction in the instant case is the informant in question--the
drunk driver--was definitely not giving information out of
concern for the community, but was giving it to try to save his
own hide.

Thus, his statements should have been suspect from the

beginning by the police.

However, instead of attempting to

verify the statements, or seek independent corroboration (as the
police did in Brown and Gates), the police simply took the
statements completely at face value and mainly based their
subsequent actions of making an illegal entry and obtaining a
warrant on the drunk driver's statements.
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Gates and Brown can easily be distinguished from the present
case, because in each of those cases the police took their time
to seek independent verification of citizen informants'
statements.

And the citizen informants in question were not even

drunk or trying to obtain leniency.

In Brown, "the officers went

to the addresses identified and verified the details of the
houses and greenhouse identified by the informant," and "The
officers personally verified all of the information that could be
verified by observation..."

Brown, 798 P.2d at 287.

In Gates,

"police corroborated the name and address of one of the
defendants and substantially corroborated the defendants' modus
operandi by observing their activities."

Gates, 462 U.S. at 226,

103 S.Ct. at 2325.
The significant point in this case is that not only should
the drunk drivers' statements have been suspect from the
beginning, but they should have been thoroughly discounted when
it became apparent to the officers that the statements were
incorrect after they entered the Defendant's home and discovered
no evidence of a big pot party.
In light of the highly suspect nature of the drunk driver's
statements, there should be no question that there was
insufficient probable cause to issue a warrant.

The only other

factors set forth in the Affidavit are the incident with Brett
Potter and the dog, uncorroborated statements by police
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informants that the Defendant was in the drug trade, the
occupants of the trailer peering out the window, and that one of
the occupants of the trailer peering out the window, Jim Ward,
had previously been convicted of drug use.

It should be

remembered that the police discovered no illegal substances as
the result of the incident with Brett.

Also, it is only natural

for people to look out their windows to see what is going on when
you have a police car with its lights flashing near your house.
And furthermore, just because a person has been previously
convicted of drug use, does that mean that everywhere he goes
drugs are being used?

In light of the totality of the

circumstances as they really were, and as they should have been
explained to the magistrate, there was insufficient probable
cause to issue the search warrant.
POINT III
AFFIANT MADE STATEMENTS IN THE AFFIDAVIT WITH RECKLESS DISREGARD
OF THE TRUTH, AND THOSE STATEMENTS SHOULD BE SET ASIDE AND
PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINED ON THE OTHER INFORMATION IN THE
AFFIDAVIT.
"In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978),
the United States Supreme Court held that where a defendant shows
by a preponderance of the evidence that affiant made a false
statement, intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard
for the truth, the false material must be set to one side and
probable cause determined by the affidavit's remaining contents."
Brown, 798 P.2d at 288.

"If the remaining content is
26

insufficient to establish probable cause, the warrant must be
voided."

Brown. 798 P.2d at 288.

In the present case, the affiant, officer Tom Harrison, made
statements in the affidavit with reckless disregard for the truth
in that he included the statements of the drunk driver, and this
was after officer Harrison had personally observed no evidence of
any pot party going on at the Defendant's residence.

Defendant

submits that it would have made a significant difference to the
magistrate if he knew that there were only three individuals in
the residence, there was no lingering odor of marijuana, there
were no visual signs of controlled substances, and none of the
individuals appeared to be under the influence of illegal
substances.

Officer Harrison did not make these facts known to

the magistrate, and he did so with reckless disregard for the
truth.
By excluding the statements of the drunk driver from the
affidavit, there is no question that there is insufficient
probable cause to issue a warrant.

The only remaining factors

are the incident with Brett Potter, the peering out the window,
the uncorroborated statements of other police informants, and the
fact that one of the occupants had previously been convicted of
drug use.

As set forth above, these facts do not constitute

probable cause.
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POINT IV
THE SEARCH WARRANT IS DEFECTIVE ON ITS FACE BECAUSE IT DID NOT
PARTICULARLY DESCRIBE THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, require that "no
warrants shall issue...without particularly describing the place
to be searched..."

The general rule is that "under the Fourth

Amendment, a search warrant sufficiently describes the place to
be searched if the officer with a search warrant can, with
reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place to be
searched."

See United States v. Vaughn, 830 F.2d 1185, 1186

(D.C. Cir. 1987) .
In the instant case the warrant did not describe the
defendant's residence with particularity, and there is serious
doubt whether an officer could have ascertained the place to be
searched.

The warrant described the place to be searched as "50

West 400 North, Blacks Trailer Court, Single wide trailer, second
trailer headed West on 400 North on South side of road, belonging
to DeVon Potter."

First, the warrant did not set forth a city,

only street coordinates.

The street address could very well be

in other towns such as Castle Dale, Orangeville, and Ferrin.
Second, the street address itself is wrong.

The Defendant lives

at 75 West 400 North, and not 50 West 400 North.

Third, the

Defendant's trailer is the third one heading West on 400 North,
not the second one.

And fourth, there evidently was some mix up
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as to which trailer belonged to the Defendant as evidenced by
Officer Harrison initially going to the wrong trailer.
Therefore, the requirement of particularity was not met, and the
search warrant should be voided.
The cases cited by the state in support of its argument that
there is sufficient particularity are easily distinguishable.

In

United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090 (11th Cir. 1986), the
warrant gave a detailed description of the apartment to be
searched.

It described the dwelling as "38 Throop St., is a two-

story red brick building, trimmed in a reddish brown paint with a
shingled roof and three adjacent apartments with apartment 840
being the far left apartment at the address looking at it from
the front."

784 F.2d at 1091. Even though the street address

was wrong, it is no wonder with that detailed of a description
that the court held there was sufficient particularity.
present case, there was no such detailed description.

In the
The only

description of the residence itself was "single wide trailer."
Defendant's trailer was in a trailer court and there was probably
lots of single wide trailers.

In State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d

1099, 1102-1103 (Utah 1985), there was also a detailed
description of the enclosure by Defendant's home to be searched.
Even so far as describing the material the fence was made of
around the enclosure.

And in State v. Mclntire. 768 P. 2d 970

(Utah App. 1989), this court looked to the affidavit for
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clarification of the description.

In the present case, there is

no such clarification because the description in the warrant is
exactly the same as in the affidavit.
One of the many deficiencies in the description is the city
was not mentioned.

It has been held that failure to allege the

city is not fatal.

See, State v. LeFort, 248 Kan. 332, 806 P.2d

986 (1991).

However, this was because of the considerable

"detail on the face of the warrant describing the place to be
searched, including the street address, the type of construction
and color of the house, the particular outbuildings described and
ownership specified." 806 P.2d at 990. Here we don't have such a
specific description to salvage the warrant.

There is simply no

way that an officer looking at this warrant could with reasonable
effort ascertain the place that was intended to be searched.

The

state asserts that the reasonable effort analysis is satisfied
because, "The officer knew, all along, the correct location of
the home."

(Appellant's brief p. 17.)

This is not true as

evidenced by the fact that the officer who was the affiant and
who served the warrant admittedly went to the wrong trailer when
he first went to the

scene, and this happened in spite of the

fact that the police supposedly had Defendant's house under
constant surveillance.
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POINT V
THE "GOOD FAITH" EXCEPTION OF LEON IS NOT APPLICABLE.
Finally, the state attempts to vindicate the violation of
the Defendant's constitutional rights by citing the "good faith"
exception set forth in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104
S.Ct. 3405 (1984).

The state has the burden of showing the

necessary elements of this good faith exception.

State v.

Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987) . The applicability of the good
faith exception is conditional upon the officers acting "in an
objectively reasonable manner."

The officers did no act in an

objectively reasonable manner in this case in that they did not
take any measures to independently verify Sandstrom's specific
statements before entering the trailer.

In addition, they went

ahead and based the affidavit primarily on Sandstrom7s statements
which they previously had some indication were not true because
of the officers' observations when they entered the trailer.

The

officers admitted under oath that there were no observable signs
that what Sandstrom had said was true.
designed to deter police misconduct."

The exclusionary rule is
Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 104

S.Ct. at 341. This deterrent purpose is not served when the
police acted reasonably and the only mistake is some defect in
the warrant such as an erroneous finding of probable cause by the
magistrate which was the case in Leon.

In United States v.

Vasey, 834 F.2d 782 (9th Cir. 1987), the prosecution also raised
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the good faith exception.

In holding that the good faith

exception was not applicable, the court distinguished its case
from Leon in the following manner.
The instant case differs. Officer Jensen conducted an
illegal search and represented tainted evidence obtained in
this search to a magistrate in an effort to obtain a search
warrant. The search warrant was issued, at least in part,
on the basis of this tainted evidence. The constitution
error was made by the officer in this case, not by the
magistrate as in Leon. The Leon court made it very clear
that the exclusionary rule should apply (i.e. the good faith
exception should not apply) if the exclusion of evidence
would alter the behavior of individual law enforcement
officers or the policies of their department. (Cases
omitted) Officer Jensen's conducting an illegal warrantless
search and including evidence found in this search in an
affidavit in support of a warrant is an activity that the
exclusionary rule was meant to deter. 834 F.2d at 789.
See also, United States v. Scales, 903 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1990),
wherein the defendant's suit case was seized without a warrant
and then held until a warrant could be obtained.

The Tenth

Circuit Court of Appeals held that Leon did not apply using the
same rationale as in Vasey.
The present case is almost exactly like Vasey.

We have

prior police miscondujt in the illegal entry and the inclusion in
the affidavit of tainted evidence obtained after the illegal
entry.
This is certainly a case where the officers acted
unreasonably, and by suppressing the evidence in this case the
Court can serve the purposes of the exclusionary rule and deter
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future inappropriate conduct by indicating to the police that
they simply cannot enter a person's home without a warrant unless
there are substantial exigent circumstances, and that they cannot
base a warrant simply on the unverified statements of a drunk
driver, and that they cannot obtain a warrant after discovering
that much of what the drunk driver has said is incorrect and then
not relaying that information to the issuing magistrate.

The

Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that "exclusion of
illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police
violations of article I, section 14." State v. Lorocco, 135 Utah
Adv. Rep. 16, 25 (Utah 1990).

This is one of those cases in

which exclusion of the evidence is a necessary consequence.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the fact that Defendant's constitutional rights
were violated by the illegal entry, and because of the
deficiencies in the warrant as set forth above, Defendant
respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial court's
order of suppression.
Respectfully submitted this ^- day of February, 1993.
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